When the Dust Settles: Reflections on Bosnia’s Protests and Plena

As the force that brought people onto Bosnia’s streets and saw the formation of citizens’ ‘plena’ around the country earlier this year appears to fade, Cera Murtagh considers what that movement has achieved

The social protests that erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina this February came as a dramatic development that caught many an observer off guard.  As burning public buildings gave way to peaceful protest and the birth of citizens’ assemblies, commentators grappled to explain what this meant for the future of the country. Perspectives ran the full range, from heralding the movement as the long awaited revolution that could transform the post-Dayton state from the bottom-up, to dismissing it as an inconsequential anti-establishment demonstration. Now, some four months on, as the protests and plena appear to have lost momentum, some space for reflection has opened up. So what, if anything, can the movement be said to have achieved?

From the street to the plenum 

The protests began in early February in the industrial north eastern town of
Tuzla, as people took to the streets to express their anger at mass unemployment, factory closures and corrupt privatisations. The unrest quickly spread to towns and cities from Mostar to Bihac, where frustration with joblessness, poverty, government corruption and a bloated and dysfunctional political system established by the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, found resonance.  Within days direct democratic fora in the shape of ‘plena’ were being established to translate the grievances of the protests into concrete demands and take those demands to the political institutions – local, cantonal and Federation (one of Bosnia’s two sub-state entities) governments. Demands focused on social and economic rights and political accountability, including improved welfare benefits, an end to excessive perks for politicians and a review of privatisation deals.  An impressive – and unexpected - manifestation of direct democracy, in a post-war state where civil society has been notably weak. But what has come as a result?

Tangible changes

First and foremost, one can look to tangible changes on the ground.  Some quick wins were secured in the wake of the initial unrest, as four cantonal governments resigned and some agreed to end certain benefits and privileges, such as the notorious ‘white bread’ perk, where cantonal ministers could continue to receive their salaries for a year after leaving their posts. In Tuzla Canton an ‘expert government’ has been installed and is reportedly working in cooperation with the plenum. The wider world also took notice, with the international community signalling its support and the EU announcing a shift in approach towards BiH to focus more on social and economic reforms than elite negotiation over constitutional changes. Arising from a civil movement only a few weeks old, these achievements should not be underplayed.

The question of political engagement 

But the question of broader political change is a more complex one.  Indeed, this has been a point of tension between the movement and Bosnia’s more formalised civil society, in the shape of its NGO sector.


Meeting of the Sarajevo Plenum, February 2014

Some in the sector, having worked for years towards constitutional change and political reform, saw the protests and plena as a unique opportunity to drive that agenda forward and transform Bosnia’s dysfunctional post-Dayton institutions from the bottom up.  Indeed, as representative of the Tuzla plenum Jasmina Husanović told a recent Sarajevo Peace Event discussion, elements of the international community have also encouraged the plenum to form its own political party in order to effect political change.  

Those in the plena, however, had other ideas.  Plenum demands were born locally, out of the problems in people’s everyday lives, and remained so. They focused on basic social and economic rights – so-called ‘bread and butter issues’ - and were directed primarily at the local, cantonal and, to a limited extent, federal level of government. There was a strong reluctance within the plena to engage in high politics, and certainly to enter the debate on constitutional reform.  Any suggestion of forming a political party or backing an existing party in the October elections to state, entity and cantonal institutions met with resolute resistance at meetings. In a movement born out of disillusion with, and disdain for, politics the lack of appetite for political engagement should hardly surprise.  

This lack of engagement with the political process became a source of frustration for some in the NGO sector, however. Some felt that by focusing on the symptoms of Bosnia’s problems – the social - and not the causes – the political, i.e. the Dayton system – the plena could change nothing.  Furthermore, in an election year, they saw the failure influence the outcome of those elections - and catalyse the civil movement into concrete political change - as a major missed opportunity.

The reasons for the plena’s reluctance to enter the fray of formal politics must be examined a little more closely, however. The perils of translating demands that emerge organically from people on the streets into a broader political movement cannot be underestimated.  As Svjetlana Nedimović, participant of the Sarajevo protests and attendee of the Sarajevo Plenum, articulated at the Sarajevo Peace Event, at this embryonic stage any attempt to catalyse the civic movement into a political one would have been risky. Such a move could have divided the broad-based movement, derailing it before it had gotten fully off the ground. It has been argued that participation in the October elections – either through a new party or cooperation with existing ‘civic’ parties – could have proved fatal, in the event of a poor showing or failure to follow through on promises thereafter.

A civic awakening?

It could equally be argued that engagement in the political process, even if likely to fail, is the only way to achieve change - and in any case, the movement has ground to a halt anyway.  But many participants in the protests and plena feel that though it may have gone away for now, this was only the first wave; a civic platform has been created that can be built upon in future. What’s more, an awakening has taken place in the minds of the people that they can do something to change their social and political reality – a fact which has also dawned on the political elite. While this shift in mindsets could be politically instrumentalised at a later date - perhaps for the 2016 local elections – many feel this point is too soon; it must first be allowed to develop as a civic movement.  

When viewed from the perspective of concrete political change, or indeed improvement of people’s living conditions, at this point, Bosnia’s protests and plena could be assessed to have had a relatively limited impact. However, if one looks a little deeper, this could be the potential first step in a longer term democratic shift.

Bosnia’s Elections 2014 – Cantonal Level

It’s an election year here in Bosnia, with October elections to legislatures in 10 cantons, both entities and the state parliament, and direct presidential elections in Republika Srpska and for the three member state presidency. The elections run on a four year cycle, with elections to the municipal councils running every four years in the interim. Olympic games – municipal elections; Football world cup – state, entities and cantons.
Municipal elections as a mid-term indicator

The municipal elections can serve as a useful guide to directions of change – when I was writing Making the Transition the 2008 vote pointed towards the decline of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) one of the main advocates of centralisation in Bosnia. They had enjoyed major success in 2006, including securing the Bosniak seat on the state Presidency; and many of their 2006 gains were subsequently wiped out in 2010.

2014 seems more difficult to predict, given the unrest and dissatisfaction evident, especially in the Federation. It doesn’t seem that any party has been able to respond to the dissatisfaction in a way that might translate into electoral support.

A tale of two peoples? Stability and change

Maps showing the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with Brčko District, and the 10 Cantons of the federation. Maps taken from Making the Transition, 2011.

At the level of the cantons, pooling the results of Municipal elections suggested a fair degree of stability in the three cantons more heavily populated by Croats (Posavina [2 in the map above] in the north and Western Herzegovina [8] and Canton 10*). Here, politics is dominated by the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ BiH) and their splinter party, HDZ 1990.

There are five Cantons which have larger concentrations of Bosniaks (1 Una Sana, 3 Tuzla, 4 Zenica-Doboj, 5 Bosnian Podrinja, 9 Sarajevo). Throughout these, the main picture seems to be that the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the party formerly led by Alija Izetbegović, is gaining in strength, mainly at the expense of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). This fits with a degree of disillusionment over the SDP record in government; the SDP member of the state Presidency resigned from the party in the middle of his term, serving the remaining time as an independent. 

Tuzla Canton: Projections for 2014 elections based on 2012 municipal results, showing stability for most parties but a loss of 3 seats for SDP and an equivalent gain for SDA. 

Two further cantons, Central Bosnia [6], and Herzegovina-Neretva [7], based around Mostar, have a more even split between the Bosniak and Croat population. Mostar failed to hold municipal elections in 2012, and as it has the largest electorate in the H-N canton, the absence this means there is less of a solid indicator of changes or stability in political direction

In Central Bosnia, the patterns of the Bosniak and Croat-dominated cantons are repeated: stability in HDZ BiH and other Croat-oriented parties (who make up around 1/3 of assembly members). There are drops in support for the SDP as well as for Bosniak-oriented and Multi-ethnic parties (SBB, SBiH, NSRB, the latter possibly winning no seats). The SDA looks to gain from these losses to make up roughly 1/3 of the assembly. 

‘All else being equal’ these educated guesses might suggest a shift back to the domination of the SDA and HDZ in the Federation, but in light of the protests and the Plenums in this part of the country, ‘all things being equal’ does not seem like a safe assumption. New parties can emerge and make an impact relatively swiftly here, as was seen when media-boss Fahrudin Radončić launched his Union for a Better Future (SBB) party in 2009, gaining enough support to secure ministerial representation in the state government after the 2010 elections. Not everyone has a media empire to back them up (Alfa TV, daily paper Dnevni Avaz), but to a lesser extent, other new parties (NSRB, founded 2001) and splinter parties (HDZ 1990, Party of Democratic Activity ASDA) have been able to form a presence, especially at the local level. 

The parties

Following is a list of the main parties covered here

• ASDA, Party of Democratic Activity, splinter party of SDA, Bosniak-oriented, strongest in Una Sana and Zenica cantons. 
• HDZ BiH, Croatian Democratic Union, largest Croat-oriented party, strongest in Croat-dominated cantons and mixed cantons, but present in Assemblies in Zenica-Doboj and Tuzla too. One of the main pre-war parties of government. 
• HDZ 1990, Croatian Democratic Union 1990, splinter party of HDZ BiH, present in Croat and mixed cantons. 
• NSRB, People’s Party for Improvement through Work, multi-ethnic, liberal party founded in 2001, presence has been building in most cantons, but mid-term results suggest a fall-off in support. 
• SBB, multi-ethnic party founded by media-boss and construction entrepreneur Fahrudin Radončić, recently removed from office as minister of security following violent anti-government protests in February. Represented in all cantons except Western Herzegovina and Canton 10. 
• SBiH, Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, pro-centralisation Bosniak party, enjoyed success in 2006 elections, but saw a major turnaround in 2010. Represented in all cantons except Western Herzegovina and Canton 10.
• SDA, Party of Democratic Action, the largest Bosniak-oriented party and another of the main pre-war parties, represented in all Cantons except Western Herzegovina. After losses in 2010, bounced back in municipal elections. 
• SDP, Social Democratic Party, multi-ethnic party, has been in office at various levels and stages in post-war Bosnia. Largest party in a number of Cantons in 2010 elections (Una Sana, Tuzla, Bosnian Podrinja, Sarajevo). 

*The naming of Canton 10 is a matter of dispute, and it is known variously as Kanton 10, Livanjski kanton, and Hercegbosanska županija. 

Sarajevo Plenum – Deliberation and Demands

Last week, I had my first opportunity to attend one of the Plenums, citizen forums that have been set up in many towns and cities in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the protests in February. In Sarajevo, these meet at Dom Mladih, the Youth House.

It was an important meeting as those present voted on the proposed demands to be sent to the Cantonal Assembly here in Sarajevo, and to the Federal Parliament.

The meeting starts with a reminder of house rules, emphasising the fact that while the plenum has moderators, it does not have leaders. The plenums give attendees the space to speak for up to two minutes, and with the support of the room, this can be extended. From these talks, and from working groups, proposals are formulated which go to a vote.

The Plenum heard from representatives visiting from the other Plenums. Of these, the Tuzla representative raised the loudest cheers. In Tuzla they have enjoyed a number of successes, including limiting a range of financial benefits for cantonal assembly members, and the appointment of a new premier, Bahrija Umihanić, a professor of economics. Although the process of appointment was not in line with the Plenum’s hopes, Umihanić attended the meeting of the Plenum in Tuzla on Saturday, suggesting a willingness for dialogue.

In Sarajevo, the demands that had been formulated over preceding weeks were put to a vote, and each received broad support. The Sarajevo Plenum demands to the Cantonal Assembly include a range of social measures, including unemployment benefits, a call for new employment programmes, and space on broadcast media to widen the dialogue represented by the plenum. Demands to the Federal government have been sent to other Plenums, so that a united position can be presented. Already these have the support of Mostar, Tuzla and Bugojno Plenums.

Last Thursday, the local, cantonal demands were to be presented to the Cantonal Assembly, but a scout through the web-based media for that day suggested that it had made little in the way of ripples. Likewise the agenda for today's meeting of the assembly made no mention of it. This reflects something of a loss of the force behind public messages about the level of disappointment with government. The street protests in Sarajevo, while enduring, are much reduced in numbers, and the regular coverage has faded.

There will be elections later this year, but the Plenums are avowedly not endorsing any political party, so for now the issue seems to be one of translating the deliberative work of the Plenums into policy that is considered, adjusted and possibly delivered by representatives chosen in general elections. 

Meeting of the Sarajevo Plenum - 12 March 2014

Reading the (Bosnian) Riots

Last summer, William Hunt, Ferida Duraković and Zvonimir Radeljković wrote in Dissent about the possibility that a younger generation of Bosnians might turn to protest. Less than a year on, this has come to pass, but it is not just the younger generation, rather people of all ages. 

My first few days in the country have given me a chance to talk to people about the protests in a number of cities here, and about the violence that took place in early February in Tuzla, Bihać, Mostar, Sarajevo and Zenica, the five largest cities in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

The move from relatively peaceful protests to a swift escalation and spread brought to mind the UK’s own riots in 2011, when what started as a peaceful protest outside a police station in Tottenham became violent, and then spread first to other areas of London and then to other major urban centres in England. 

The most obvious difference between those riots, and the riots here in Bosnia, is the targeted nature of violence. Here, the targets were overwhelmingly government buildings, including cantonal government offices, state institutions, and in Mostar, political party offices. This is in stark contrast to the UK, where a joint Guardian/LSE report, Reading the Riots, paints a picture of a combination of battles with police and the widespread targeting of commercial premises. 

The sources of dissatisfaction bear some similarity, albeit defined by different contexts. The Guardian/LSE study sample of rioters most commonly cited poverty, policing, government policy, unemployment and the shooting of Mark Duggan as important causes of the riots. 

Before the widespread riots of 7 February, protests in Tuzla had centred on the collapse of the canton’s industries, particularly after a series of privatisations. Workers who saw their industries, their jobs and their livelihoods disappear, sought some form of compensation. Alongside this is a strong sense that the politicians here are doing very well in a country suffering widespread poverty and mass unemployment. A common chant heard during protests is lopovi (thieves). Again and again, injustice comes up. But the background of dissatisfaction with the police and policing has not been a factor I have seen here yet. 

In another way, policing may be important. When I was last in Sarajevo in 2005 various international agencies, including the EU and the Office of the High Representative, were focusing on the problem of police coordination in a country with 10 cantonal forces, two entity forces, a special district force, a state force, and a border force. A television campaign featured a police officer pursuing gangsters, only to be stopped by an invisible barrier. While maintaining day to day order is a responsibility of Cantonal police, the security of Federal and State buildings is down to those particular levels of government. So in Sarajevo, when there is a mass protest, which involves attacks on Federal and State buildings, three forces are involved, and it has been suggested that failures in coordination limited the police ability to contain the violence. 

A number of stories are doing the rounds regarding the violence, the extent to which it was orchestrated and if police ineffectiveness might have been part of a political strategy. It’s interesting that these stories have currency, but on the question of the police response, it is also worth remembering how many days passed in the UK before the riots of 2011 were contained. 

As it happened, the violence was more or less limited to two days in Tuzla and one in other cities. Like in London and other UK cities, it was followed by citizen-led clean-up actions. It has also been followed by a more peaceful form of direct democracy, as plenums meet in various locations and pass requests to governments. Already, the Tuzla plenum has claimed a victory in the scrapping of the bijeli hljeb (white bread) payments that representatives receive at the end of their mandate. 

Getting back to Bosnia

It’s nearly 10 years since I left Sarajevo, and I think I’ve got a lot of catching up to do. 

Last month, I spent an evening with a group of UK Army officers discussing my research on international intervention and assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Much of this focused on the respective roles of international police missions (my area) and military missions (theirs) in stabilisation and democratisation. 

Beyond that, and with an eye to possible future deployments, the company were interested in possible sources of unrest and disorder in the future. I didn’t see any trouble on the near horizon. 

Less than a month later, there was barely a window left on the front of the Tuzla Canton Government building, and the BHRT Dnevnik, the national broadcaster’s news programme, was showing images of similar destruction in other cities including Mostar, Sarajevo and Zenica. Like I say, I’ve got a lot of catching up to do. 

My catching up starts properly in a few days, when I begin a six month stay in Sarajevo, working on research, and supported through an association with the Faculty of Criminology, Criminalistics and Security Studies at the University of Sarajevo. 

So, when asked about sources of disorder, why didn’t I see what was just round the corner? 

Perhaps because it was something absolutely new. Watching the news the day after, and talking to a colleague in Sarajevo, there seemed to be a genuine sense of shock at the violence of the protests on Friday 7 February. 

Moreover, while the dissatisfaction underlying the protests may be enduring, the violence itself was fleeting. And watching developments subsequently, there has been a fairly swift move to establish Plenums, forums of citizens gathering, formulating and peacefully articulating their requests to the governing bodies that they feel let down by. 

So maybe I can be forgiven for not seeing what was about to happen. Either way, it’s an exciting and interesting time to be getting back to Bosnia. 

Sarajevo in 2005, the view from Vraca Memorial Park