Local Empowerment: An Answer to Constitutional Reform in BiH?

A new civic coalition, K143, has launched a model for constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina that envisions vesting power at the state and local levels. Could this blueprint offer a solution to the dysfunctionality of the BiH state and, moreover, find its way through the protracted deadlock on the issue? Cera Murtagh considers the prospects

The dysfunctionality of Bosnia and Hercegovina's state structures needs little underlining. The need for reform of the complex, multi-layered political system to which the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords gave birth - entailing a weak central state, two sub-state entities, 10 cantons, 143 local municipalities and one semi-autonomous district – has been the constant theme of Bosnia’s post-war transition. This year that need was brought into sharp focus as people took to the streets in protest against a corrupt, expensive political system that is not working for them. The May floods further exposed the inability of the governing structures to serve the needs of its people as delays, inefficiency, lack of coordination and, indeed, corruption, beset responses to the natural disaster.

A 'Municipalization Model'

Now, a coalition of civil society organisations in Bosnia has devised a plan for reform that it believes can address these fundamental problems and transform Bosnia’s state into a functioning democracy. The group, named Koalicija 143 after the number of municipalities in Bosnia, and led by the Center for Civic Cooperation in Livno, is proposing a 'Municipalization Model' that would see the current multi-level governance system shift to a two-level structure: state and local. With these two levels strengthened and the middle levels (entities and cantons) removed, a number of powers would be devolved downwards to the municipal level, such as local transport and local agriculture, forestry and fisheries, while others, such as healthcare, unemployment benefits and pensions, would be pushed upwards to the state. A number of new state ministries would come into being as a result, including a Ministry of Agriculture and a Ministry of Education.

Functionality & accountability

In response to the ills of the Dayton system, the model is based on the twin principles of functionality and democratic accountability. The two-level structure would be significantly more efficient than the current complex apparatus, the coalition argues, reaping efficiencies of 500m km (€255m) that would be ploughed back into spending on public services such as healthcare and education. The group estimates that spending per capita would rise by 22% for RS residents as a result.

On the democratic side, K143 believes the model would bring government in Bosnia closer to the people. On the state level, voters would directly elect members to the House of Representatives under a First Past the Post model, unlike the current party list system of proportional representation whereby voters can only choose from a list put together by parties. The municipality would form the electoral unit with each municipality electing at least one Member of Parliament. In multi-member municipalities a form of rank-order PR would replace FPTP. State government would be headed by a Prime Minister who would have to gain three-fifths majority in parliament, while a single president, with solely representative functions, would also be elected by parliament.

Local empowerment

But this is also a blueprint for local empowerment. The model would see as much power as possible devolved downward to Bosnia's 143 municipalities. As the level of government closest to, and most trusted by, people, the coalition argues this redistribution will empower Bosnia's citizens, giving them more control over how they are governed and making representatives more accountable to their demands. In this way, the model chimes with wider global arguments for democratic reform based on local empowerment, such as those along the lines of the Nordic model being advanced by some ahead of the independence referendum in Scotland.

A further hope is that shifting the focus to local issues that matter to people could give rise to more issue-based politics and an end to the dominance of ethno-national politics. The coalition foresees regional cooperation between municipalities in the interest of economic development, on areas like forestry and tourism. Foča arguably has more to gain from regional economic links with Sarajevo than it does with Banja Luka, for example. The group believes this ground-up approach could gradually change the character of politics in BiH, as rational local self-interest trumps ethnic interests.

Group protections

But, needless to say, in the post-Dayton context no model would see the light of day without guarantees for the 'constitutent peoples'. Mindful of this reality, the model includes a number of direct and indirect mechanisms for group protection. At state level, sensitive issues, such as electing governments and passing budgets, would be dealt with through qualified majority voting, requiring a three-fifths majority in Parliament. Furthermore, voters would elect a Council of Peoples to oversee legislation from the House of Representatives in order to safeguard Vital National Interests. Unlike under the current system however, these interests would be constitutionally defined. The 20 member body would consist of five representatives of each constituent people, as well as five others/national minorities and would be elected within a single country-wide electoral unit. At the local level, a Council for Intercommunity Relations with similar powers would be elected.

Rational self-interest

The product of several years of work by many of those involved, the Municipalization Model comes as a sophisticated and well thought through plan for constitutional reform in BiH. This is a model with rational choice at its core. It has looked at the issue from the perspective of each 'constituent people', as well as those who do not identify as a member of any of these groups, pre-empted concerns and outlined what is in it for each. Under the model, it argues, no group could be dominated by another, while, for example, Croat-majority communities would gain greater representation at local and state level and RS residents would benefit from greater public spending and better services.

Challenges

Appealing to the rational self-interest of actors is no doubt a smart move. But what about the self-interest of the political elites? Nationalist parties and politicians have little to gain and a great deal to lose from this model, which, in abolishing entities and cantons, proposes to cut away a substantial portion of their power base.

The K143 document admits that there 'nothing in here for the current political elites', but says it plans to build consensus from the bottom-up: 'a critical mass of citizens drawn from each self-defined group of people in society'. But as the persistent block to previous attempts at constitutional reform, it is not clear how the coalition plans to by-pass the entrenched power of Bosnia's elites and their interest in perpetuating the status-quo. Although it has put forward some solid arguments for how each community would be protected under the model, it will still be all too easy for parties, particularly in the RS, to portray it as threatening 'their group's' interests – as has been evident from some of the reaction already.

Countering these emotive forces will be no small challenge for the coalition. Other questions include how the system would tackle – or prevent increasing - political corruption and patronage at the local level. Nevertheless, this civic initiative comes as a positive and significant contribution to the debate on constitutional reform in Bosnia. In the coming year it plans to build a broad coalition of individuals and organisations in support of the model. It has a hefty task ahead of it, but if it manages to move the debate forward and contribute to a longer term solution it will be a considerable achievement.

When the Dust Settles: Reflections on Bosnia’s Protests and Plena

As the force that brought people onto Bosnia’s streets and saw the formation of citizens’ ‘plena’ around the country earlier this year appears to fade, Cera Murtagh considers what that movement has achieved

The social protests that erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina this February came as a dramatic development that caught many an observer off guard.  As burning public buildings gave way to peaceful protest and the birth of citizens’ assemblies, commentators grappled to explain what this meant for the future of the country. Perspectives ran the full range, from heralding the movement as the long awaited revolution that could transform the post-Dayton state from the bottom-up, to dismissing it as an inconsequential anti-establishment demonstration. Now, some four months on, as the protests and plena appear to have lost momentum, some space for reflection has opened up. So what, if anything, can the movement be said to have achieved?

From the street to the plenum 

The protests began in early February in the industrial north eastern town of
Tuzla, as people took to the streets to express their anger at mass unemployment, factory closures and corrupt privatisations. The unrest quickly spread to towns and cities from Mostar to Bihac, where frustration with joblessness, poverty, government corruption and a bloated and dysfunctional political system established by the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, found resonance.  Within days direct democratic fora in the shape of ‘plena’ were being established to translate the grievances of the protests into concrete demands and take those demands to the political institutions – local, cantonal and Federation (one of Bosnia’s two sub-state entities) governments. Demands focused on social and economic rights and political accountability, including improved welfare benefits, an end to excessive perks for politicians and a review of privatisation deals.  An impressive – and unexpected - manifestation of direct democracy, in a post-war state where civil society has been notably weak. But what has come as a result?

Tangible changes

First and foremost, one can look to tangible changes on the ground.  Some quick wins were secured in the wake of the initial unrest, as four cantonal governments resigned and some agreed to end certain benefits and privileges, such as the notorious ‘white bread’ perk, where cantonal ministers could continue to receive their salaries for a year after leaving their posts. In Tuzla Canton an ‘expert government’ has been installed and is reportedly working in cooperation with the plenum. The wider world also took notice, with the international community signalling its support and the EU announcing a shift in approach towards BiH to focus more on social and economic reforms than elite negotiation over constitutional changes. Arising from a civil movement only a few weeks old, these achievements should not be underplayed.

The question of political engagement 

But the question of broader political change is a more complex one.  Indeed, this has been a point of tension between the movement and Bosnia’s more formalised civil society, in the shape of its NGO sector.


Meeting of the Sarajevo Plenum, February 2014

Some in the sector, having worked for years towards constitutional change and political reform, saw the protests and plena as a unique opportunity to drive that agenda forward and transform Bosnia’s dysfunctional post-Dayton institutions from the bottom up.  Indeed, as representative of the Tuzla plenum Jasmina Husanović told a recent Sarajevo Peace Event discussion, elements of the international community have also encouraged the plenum to form its own political party in order to effect political change.  

Those in the plena, however, had other ideas.  Plenum demands were born locally, out of the problems in people’s everyday lives, and remained so. They focused on basic social and economic rights – so-called ‘bread and butter issues’ - and were directed primarily at the local, cantonal and, to a limited extent, federal level of government. There was a strong reluctance within the plena to engage in high politics, and certainly to enter the debate on constitutional reform.  Any suggestion of forming a political party or backing an existing party in the October elections to state, entity and cantonal institutions met with resolute resistance at meetings. In a movement born out of disillusion with, and disdain for, politics the lack of appetite for political engagement should hardly surprise.  

This lack of engagement with the political process became a source of frustration for some in the NGO sector, however. Some felt that by focusing on the symptoms of Bosnia’s problems – the social - and not the causes – the political, i.e. the Dayton system – the plena could change nothing.  Furthermore, in an election year, they saw the failure influence the outcome of those elections - and catalyse the civil movement into concrete political change - as a major missed opportunity.

The reasons for the plena’s reluctance to enter the fray of formal politics must be examined a little more closely, however. The perils of translating demands that emerge organically from people on the streets into a broader political movement cannot be underestimated.  As Svjetlana Nedimović, participant of the Sarajevo protests and attendee of the Sarajevo Plenum, articulated at the Sarajevo Peace Event, at this embryonic stage any attempt to catalyse the civic movement into a political one would have been risky. Such a move could have divided the broad-based movement, derailing it before it had gotten fully off the ground. It has been argued that participation in the October elections – either through a new party or cooperation with existing ‘civic’ parties – could have proved fatal, in the event of a poor showing or failure to follow through on promises thereafter.

A civic awakening?

It could equally be argued that engagement in the political process, even if likely to fail, is the only way to achieve change - and in any case, the movement has ground to a halt anyway.  But many participants in the protests and plena feel that though it may have gone away for now, this was only the first wave; a civic platform has been created that can be built upon in future. What’s more, an awakening has taken place in the minds of the people that they can do something to change their social and political reality – a fact which has also dawned on the political elite. While this shift in mindsets could be politically instrumentalised at a later date - perhaps for the 2016 local elections – many feel this point is too soon; it must first be allowed to develop as a civic movement.  

When viewed from the perspective of concrete political change, or indeed improvement of people’s living conditions, at this point, Bosnia’s protests and plena could be assessed to have had a relatively limited impact. However, if one looks a little deeper, this could be the potential first step in a longer term democratic shift.