Local Empowerment: An Answer to Constitutional Reform in BiH?

A new civic coalition, K143, has launched a model for constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina that envisions vesting power at the state and local levels. Could this blueprint offer a solution to the dysfunctionality of the BiH state and, moreover, find its way through the protracted deadlock on the issue? Cera Murtagh considers the prospects

The dysfunctionality of Bosnia and Hercegovina's state structures needs little underlining. The need for reform of the complex, multi-layered political system to which the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords gave birth - entailing a weak central state, two sub-state entities, 10 cantons, 143 local municipalities and one semi-autonomous district – has been the constant theme of Bosnia’s post-war transition. This year that need was brought into sharp focus as people took to the streets in protest against a corrupt, expensive political system that is not working for them. The May floods further exposed the inability of the governing structures to serve the needs of its people as delays, inefficiency, lack of coordination and, indeed, corruption, beset responses to the natural disaster.

A 'Municipalization Model'

Now, a coalition of civil society organisations in Bosnia has devised a plan for reform that it believes can address these fundamental problems and transform Bosnia’s state into a functioning democracy. The group, named Koalicija 143 after the number of municipalities in Bosnia, and led by the Center for Civic Cooperation in Livno, is proposing a 'Municipalization Model' that would see the current multi-level governance system shift to a two-level structure: state and local. With these two levels strengthened and the middle levels (entities and cantons) removed, a number of powers would be devolved downwards to the municipal level, such as local transport and local agriculture, forestry and fisheries, while others, such as healthcare, unemployment benefits and pensions, would be pushed upwards to the state. A number of new state ministries would come into being as a result, including a Ministry of Agriculture and a Ministry of Education.

Functionality & accountability

In response to the ills of the Dayton system, the model is based on the twin principles of functionality and democratic accountability. The two-level structure would be significantly more efficient than the current complex apparatus, the coalition argues, reaping efficiencies of 500m km (€255m) that would be ploughed back into spending on public services such as healthcare and education. The group estimates that spending per capita would rise by 22% for RS residents as a result.

On the democratic side, K143 believes the model would bring government in Bosnia closer to the people. On the state level, voters would directly elect members to the House of Representatives under a First Past the Post model, unlike the current party list system of proportional representation whereby voters can only choose from a list put together by parties. The municipality would form the electoral unit with each municipality electing at least one Member of Parliament. In multi-member municipalities a form of rank-order PR would replace FPTP. State government would be headed by a Prime Minister who would have to gain three-fifths majority in parliament, while a single president, with solely representative functions, would also be elected by parliament.

Local empowerment

But this is also a blueprint for local empowerment. The model would see as much power as possible devolved downward to Bosnia's 143 municipalities. As the level of government closest to, and most trusted by, people, the coalition argues this redistribution will empower Bosnia's citizens, giving them more control over how they are governed and making representatives more accountable to their demands. In this way, the model chimes with wider global arguments for democratic reform based on local empowerment, such as those along the lines of the Nordic model being advanced by some ahead of the independence referendum in Scotland.

A further hope is that shifting the focus to local issues that matter to people could give rise to more issue-based politics and an end to the dominance of ethno-national politics. The coalition foresees regional cooperation between municipalities in the interest of economic development, on areas like forestry and tourism. Foča arguably has more to gain from regional economic links with Sarajevo than it does with Banja Luka, for example. The group believes this ground-up approach could gradually change the character of politics in BiH, as rational local self-interest trumps ethnic interests.

Group protections

But, needless to say, in the post-Dayton context no model would see the light of day without guarantees for the 'constitutent peoples'. Mindful of this reality, the model includes a number of direct and indirect mechanisms for group protection. At state level, sensitive issues, such as electing governments and passing budgets, would be dealt with through qualified majority voting, requiring a three-fifths majority in Parliament. Furthermore, voters would elect a Council of Peoples to oversee legislation from the House of Representatives in order to safeguard Vital National Interests. Unlike under the current system however, these interests would be constitutionally defined. The 20 member body would consist of five representatives of each constituent people, as well as five others/national minorities and would be elected within a single country-wide electoral unit. At the local level, a Council for Intercommunity Relations with similar powers would be elected.

Rational self-interest

The product of several years of work by many of those involved, the Municipalization Model comes as a sophisticated and well thought through plan for constitutional reform in BiH. This is a model with rational choice at its core. It has looked at the issue from the perspective of each 'constituent people', as well as those who do not identify as a member of any of these groups, pre-empted concerns and outlined what is in it for each. Under the model, it argues, no group could be dominated by another, while, for example, Croat-majority communities would gain greater representation at local and state level and RS residents would benefit from greater public spending and better services.

Challenges

Appealing to the rational self-interest of actors is no doubt a smart move. But what about the self-interest of the political elites? Nationalist parties and politicians have little to gain and a great deal to lose from this model, which, in abolishing entities and cantons, proposes to cut away a substantial portion of their power base.

The K143 document admits that there 'nothing in here for the current political elites', but says it plans to build consensus from the bottom-up: 'a critical mass of citizens drawn from each self-defined group of people in society'. But as the persistent block to previous attempts at constitutional reform, it is not clear how the coalition plans to by-pass the entrenched power of Bosnia's elites and their interest in perpetuating the status-quo. Although it has put forward some solid arguments for how each community would be protected under the model, it will still be all too easy for parties, particularly in the RS, to portray it as threatening 'their group's' interests – as has been evident from some of the reaction already.

Countering these emotive forces will be no small challenge for the coalition. Other questions include how the system would tackle – or prevent increasing - political corruption and patronage at the local level. Nevertheless, this civic initiative comes as a positive and significant contribution to the debate on constitutional reform in Bosnia. In the coming year it plans to build a broad coalition of individuals and organisations in support of the model. It has a hefty task ahead of it, but if it manages to move the debate forward and contribute to a longer term solution it will be a considerable achievement.

When the Dust Settles: Reflections on Bosnia’s Protests and Plena

As the force that brought people onto Bosnia’s streets and saw the formation of citizens’ ‘plena’ around the country earlier this year appears to fade, Cera Murtagh considers what that movement has achieved

The social protests that erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina this February came as a dramatic development that caught many an observer off guard.  As burning public buildings gave way to peaceful protest and the birth of citizens’ assemblies, commentators grappled to explain what this meant for the future of the country. Perspectives ran the full range, from heralding the movement as the long awaited revolution that could transform the post-Dayton state from the bottom-up, to dismissing it as an inconsequential anti-establishment demonstration. Now, some four months on, as the protests and plena appear to have lost momentum, some space for reflection has opened up. So what, if anything, can the movement be said to have achieved?

From the street to the plenum 

The protests began in early February in the industrial north eastern town of
Tuzla, as people took to the streets to express their anger at mass unemployment, factory closures and corrupt privatisations. The unrest quickly spread to towns and cities from Mostar to Bihac, where frustration with joblessness, poverty, government corruption and a bloated and dysfunctional political system established by the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, found resonance.  Within days direct democratic fora in the shape of ‘plena’ were being established to translate the grievances of the protests into concrete demands and take those demands to the political institutions – local, cantonal and Federation (one of Bosnia’s two sub-state entities) governments. Demands focused on social and economic rights and political accountability, including improved welfare benefits, an end to excessive perks for politicians and a review of privatisation deals.  An impressive – and unexpected - manifestation of direct democracy, in a post-war state where civil society has been notably weak. But what has come as a result?

Tangible changes

First and foremost, one can look to tangible changes on the ground.  Some quick wins were secured in the wake of the initial unrest, as four cantonal governments resigned and some agreed to end certain benefits and privileges, such as the notorious ‘white bread’ perk, where cantonal ministers could continue to receive their salaries for a year after leaving their posts. In Tuzla Canton an ‘expert government’ has been installed and is reportedly working in cooperation with the plenum. The wider world also took notice, with the international community signalling its support and the EU announcing a shift in approach towards BiH to focus more on social and economic reforms than elite negotiation over constitutional changes. Arising from a civil movement only a few weeks old, these achievements should not be underplayed.

The question of political engagement 

But the question of broader political change is a more complex one.  Indeed, this has been a point of tension between the movement and Bosnia’s more formalised civil society, in the shape of its NGO sector.


Meeting of the Sarajevo Plenum, February 2014

Some in the sector, having worked for years towards constitutional change and political reform, saw the protests and plena as a unique opportunity to drive that agenda forward and transform Bosnia’s dysfunctional post-Dayton institutions from the bottom up.  Indeed, as representative of the Tuzla plenum Jasmina Husanović told a recent Sarajevo Peace Event discussion, elements of the international community have also encouraged the plenum to form its own political party in order to effect political change.  

Those in the plena, however, had other ideas.  Plenum demands were born locally, out of the problems in people’s everyday lives, and remained so. They focused on basic social and economic rights – so-called ‘bread and butter issues’ - and were directed primarily at the local, cantonal and, to a limited extent, federal level of government. There was a strong reluctance within the plena to engage in high politics, and certainly to enter the debate on constitutional reform.  Any suggestion of forming a political party or backing an existing party in the October elections to state, entity and cantonal institutions met with resolute resistance at meetings. In a movement born out of disillusion with, and disdain for, politics the lack of appetite for political engagement should hardly surprise.  

This lack of engagement with the political process became a source of frustration for some in the NGO sector, however. Some felt that by focusing on the symptoms of Bosnia’s problems – the social - and not the causes – the political, i.e. the Dayton system – the plena could change nothing.  Furthermore, in an election year, they saw the failure influence the outcome of those elections - and catalyse the civil movement into concrete political change - as a major missed opportunity.

The reasons for the plena’s reluctance to enter the fray of formal politics must be examined a little more closely, however. The perils of translating demands that emerge organically from people on the streets into a broader political movement cannot be underestimated.  As Svjetlana Nedimović, participant of the Sarajevo protests and attendee of the Sarajevo Plenum, articulated at the Sarajevo Peace Event, at this embryonic stage any attempt to catalyse the civic movement into a political one would have been risky. Such a move could have divided the broad-based movement, derailing it before it had gotten fully off the ground. It has been argued that participation in the October elections – either through a new party or cooperation with existing ‘civic’ parties – could have proved fatal, in the event of a poor showing or failure to follow through on promises thereafter.

A civic awakening?

It could equally be argued that engagement in the political process, even if likely to fail, is the only way to achieve change - and in any case, the movement has ground to a halt anyway.  But many participants in the protests and plena feel that though it may have gone away for now, this was only the first wave; a civic platform has been created that can be built upon in future. What’s more, an awakening has taken place in the minds of the people that they can do something to change their social and political reality – a fact which has also dawned on the political elite. While this shift in mindsets could be politically instrumentalised at a later date - perhaps for the 2016 local elections – many feel this point is too soon; it must first be allowed to develop as a civic movement.  

When viewed from the perspective of concrete political change, or indeed improvement of people’s living conditions, at this point, Bosnia’s protests and plena could be assessed to have had a relatively limited impact. However, if one looks a little deeper, this could be the potential first step in a longer term democratic shift.

Change and continuity – community service as an alternative to prison in Bosnia

A recent initiative, supported by the UK embassy* in Bosnia, has advanced the development of community service as an alternative to serving time in prison. The possibility was envisaged in a package of laws introduced under international supervision in 2003, but prior to the current initiative, there was no framework for delivery.

The focus of the initiative is to place those who might otherwise have received a sentence of up to one year in prison into workplaces which serve a recognised public good (utility firms or care work, for example). This follows recent developments in Serbia and Croatia, and is seen as part of aligning with practices elsewhere in Europe. Although a recent feature in these former Yugoslav states, it has a degree of resonance with old Yugoslav punishment practices.

In the workers’ society, the ‘sole corrective’ for the criminal lay in the reformative potential of labour. Marx’s claim in response to the workers of Gotha was reflected many years later in the Yugoslavian prison system. Large scale industrial and agricultural units were integrated into prisons, ensuring that the prisoners remained part of the workforce and part of society. Their work was conceived of as a form of therapy and social re-education.

But Bosnia today is far from the workers’ society and closer to the workless society. Here, there is massive unemployment, estimated at around 40%, but difficult to gauge due to the unknown size of the informal economy.

So, absent the logic of preparing workers for reintegration into the job market, what does the community service programme offer?

A fitting use of prisons

One of many possible logics of imprisonment is the containment of those offenders who pose a risk to society. How great the proportion of inmates that fall into this class is a matter for debate, but in a system such as Bosnia’s, without a well-developed set of alternatives, it is likely that imprisonment will extend beyond that core.

Harm reduction

If the rationale of containment does not apply, then the restrictive environment of the prison may not be the best way to achieve other objectives (punishing a wrong, working towards rehabilitation). Given a set of alternatives, and assuming that pure vengeance is not the motivating factor, it makes sense to choose the least harmful. A number of features of prison, including the separation from positive relationships with family and community members, the possibility of cultivating negative influences, and the psychological stress of living day to day in an unpredictable environment suggest that where alternatives exist, prison should be used most sparingly.

Reducing over-crowding

Harm can be reduced not only for those who are spared imprisonment, but those who are detained. By diverting some away from prison, the resources of the system are taxed less and might be used more effectively. A number of prisons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the scheme has been developed, have chronic problems with overcrowding.

Reparation

The act of working for the community is an indirect way of offering reparation for a wrong, rebranded elsewhere and in different senses as ‘payback’.

Savings

Perhaps one of the most dramatic aspects of the presentation of the scheme is the financial data. Across more than 80 sentences, 325 months of imprisonment was converted into 2,450 days of community service, with a saving of roughly €475,000. Bearing in mind these results were mainly based on two cantons, the extension of the scheme would suggest far greater savings.

Limits to social work content

The team behind delivery and reporting recognised that the scheme is predominantly work-based, and has very little in terms of social work interventions with participants. Nonetheless, that kind of support is not something they would necessarily receive in the context of a short custodial sentence. Still, certain elements of the vision of the relationship between those sentenced to community service and those who organise and oversee their work suggests a supportive role as envisaged in criminal justice social work and probation services elsewhere.

On the whole, in the context of a struggling and overcrowded prison system, and a country with limited resources, finding alternatives that are less harmful and less expensive makes sense on a number of levels.

*Delivery and reporting on the scheme by LucidLinx, a Sarajevo-based consultancy firm. 

Bosnia’s Election 2014 – The Republika Srpska Presidency

This is the second entry on the October elections - looking back to 2012's municipal elections to see if they suggest change or stability. 

Republika Srpska, the entity occupying much of the north and east of Bosnia Herzegovina, has a system of government including a legislative assembly and a directly elected President. Presidential powers include the proposal of the head of government, the granting of pardons, and putting forward candidates for the Constitutional Court.

The election for President is on the basis of the largest share of the vote, with no necessity for a run-off should no candidate secure more than 50 per cent. In 2010, Milorad Dodik, head of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), secured 51 per cent of the vote, with an alliance of other parties securing 36%.

The SNSD had something of a breakthrough in 2006, securing the entity Presidency and becoming the largest party in the assembly, falling just short of an absolute majority. As well as securing the Presidency again in 2010, they more or less maintained their strength in the assembly.

There was a point when Dodik was seen as something of a great hope by the international community – a voice of moderation in Republika Srpska, with a history of opposing Karadžić’s Serb Democratic Party (SDS) during the war. When I was last here in 2005, he was seen to be something of a shrewd political opportunist, using his own role in blocking police reforms to gain the upper hand over the SDS. More recently concerns have been raised over his own nationalist rhetoric as well as anti-democratic tendencies.

A new opposition alliance

Regarding the upcoming election, the main Republika Srpska opposition parties have already indicated that they will unite behind one candidate for October. This includes: the SDS, whose programme presents a populist, nationalist, conservative party, grounded in Orthodox Christianity, and committed to the collective rights of the Serb people; Party of Democratic Progress (PDP), whose programme encompasses all citizens in Republika Srpska as well as pressing for equality for Serb citizens in Bosnia’s other entity; and a relatively new political force formed from existing parties the People’s Democratic Movement (NDP). The latter presents itself as based on a humanism and looks to neighbouring states’ integration into Europe as a path to peace and stability, but sets this against the ‘ever problematic and exotic orient’.

Based on the direct election of municipal leaders (načelnici) in 2012*, my estimate of these parties’ relative strength compared to the SNSD puts them 6 per cent ahead, with 45 per cent of the vote. However whether a united position of the three proves to be more or less than a sum of its parts remains to be seen.

*In these elections the parties frequently stand in locally-defined coalitions. To calculate each parties individual strength, coalition votes were divided among members according to their overall relative strength in all seats where they stood independently. 

The one-toothed police officer

Yesterday, I had the chance to catch up with someone I met on my way over here. He works in one of the traditional crafts that are still pursued in the old town district around Baščaršija, something that his father and grandfather did too. I like to think that at least one member of the family would have been there when my Fodor 1973 guide to Yugoslavia was being written – it describes the owners of the small shops sitting in the entrance way, making their wares as the crowds amble past.

There will be more stories to tell, I hope, from this chance encounter. The craftsman has had some interesting personal experiences that say something about Bosnia in the last 20 or so years. As (ok - if) my language skills improve, I hope to be able to do those justice. For now, much of what he said (what I understood him to say) about his hopes and his disillusionment chime with things I have been hearing elsewhere, so in coming posts, I want to cover some general themes from our conversation. Today, it's the police.

My direct experiences with the police here so far have broadly been positive: a couple of traffic stops conducted efficiently, professionally, and in a more or less friendly manner*. Ten years ago, I would have been less confident that this would have been the case, in 2004 a Transparency International survey found that 15 per cent of respondents had been asked to pay a bribe to the police. There is still an impression here that police enjoy a range of 'fringe benefits' from their position of power.

The 'one-toothed officer'

There is a strong contrast between the image of a modern capital city (symbolised in Sarajevo by the proliferation of new shopping centres) and the police officer with only one tooth in his or her mouth as described by the craftsman. The latter is certainly something of an exaggeration, but it sums up a view of a lack of professionalism, and the clear sense that many people are in positions only on account of a system of patronage. There is no other explanation for their presence. A friend here encountered this directly, losing out to a candidate 15 or so places further down in the rankings and below the minimal required competence for the job in question.

Lack of competence is one concern, but equally so is the lack of independence that goes with this patronage. In many ways there is a sense here that police will turn their eyes away from the wrongs of those in power, while simultaneously using the law as a tool to help those elites pursue their own goals. The 'over-policing' of the protests is one example of this, perhaps too the use of terrorism provisions in pursuing charges, but other examples around the plenums, and around citizens' attempts to use public space to maintain a dialogue on change come up regularly in conversation.

So, while there may be effective, professional, good police officers here, there is also a structure that creates pressure for partisan policing and that creates space for incompetent and sometimes corrupt policing. While this structure may have been modified by processes of political division, and the arrival of multi-party democracy, it builds on the features present in the (second) former Yugoslavia.

State and party

In the one party state, there is very little differentiation between the party (in this case, the League of Communists) and the apparatus of state (government, civil service, etc.). To hold key posts throughout the system (such as the Presidency of a local court) would require party membership. With democratic elections in November 1990, and the rise of the three main nationalist parties (Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ; Party of Democratic Action, SDA; Serb Democratic Party, SDS), the strong link between party and state was not necessarily broken, it just fragmented somewhat.

Reading through case material that deals with the period from 1990 through to the middle of 1992, you can see that the shift in state-party relationship involves the new parties dividing up the offices among their own supporters. This was assisted by a system called 'the key' which was designed to achieve ethnic balance in a number of government-controlled posts, making sure that they matched the composition of the political unit (Republic, municipality). In municipalities where there was a division of power after democratic elections, that division often matched the ethnic composition of the area, and so there was a certain harmony between the objectives of the key and the party political appointments.

In such a system, the holders of offices owe their allegiance not to the state or to the people of that state, but to the partisan interests that put them there.

*More friendly when it was just a standard 'control' stop to check papers, less friendly when it was a ticking off for forgetting to drive with my headlights on, which is a legal requirement here. 

An interlude: Life lessons from Lada

I’m moving away from the political situation in Bosnia today, for a brief interlude, and a personal tale from the weekend, in which a relic of the Soviet Union taught me a valuable lesson.

Dream car #1, Renault 4, Belgrade

For some time now, I have had a hankering to have a car – not just any car, but one of two types that you still see a few of on the roads in the former Yugoslavia – the old Renault 4 or the Lada Niva, still in production today. This hankering, a desire to see more of Bosnia, and my landlord’s fixing skills came together on Friday morning, when I bought a red, 1997 Lada.

Saturday morning gave me the chance to take it up past some of the Olympic skiing zone on Bjelašnica, getting used to driving it and getting used to driving on the right-hand side of the road. All went well, even a couple of encounters with friendly and professional traffic police officers in both Republika Srpska and the Federation.

Susjetka memorial

Saturday having passed off without incident, a couple of intrepid explorers from the US embassy here agreed that it would be fun to use the Lada, as yet without a name, for a planned trip down to Foča near the Montenegrin border, and the nearby national park. We found Foča, successfully located the memorial to the Battle of Sutjeska, but after that, somehow our path was not the one we had expected to take. In what was planned as something like a 90-100 mile round trip, we ended up covering 250 miles and all kinds of marvellous terrain, from the mountain peaks around Sutjeska, to lush valleys with meandering valleys, and high flat plains (see maps, below). By the end of the day, we had been through Gacko, stopped to see some medieval tombs (Stećci) of a kind only really found within the shifting borders of the old Bosnian kingdom, and paused, somewhat exhausted to rest and eat in Mostar.

Dream car #2, Lady on Bjelašnica

Lady (as the Lada was named at some point along the way) taught us a lesson as we were sat on the verge opposite the Church of the Holy Martyr Vukasin near Pridvorci. In the hope of joining a main ‘M’ road to Sarajevo, we pursued a paved road north, and continued for some time as it became a track, and further still as it became a track that made it worth putting on Lady’s differential lock.

Once we lost faith in this track and turned round, we started to encounter a number of problems back on the sealed road. Heads were put together in the car, and we figured the diff-lock was stuck either on, or at any rate, not quite off. By this stage its little lever refused to budge in any direction, and the best offer we had was to drive in 2nd gear as far as the town of Nevesinje, at least 10 kilometres away, and hope to get it fixed the following day.

Krekovi Necropolis

It is at this point that one or two sentences, in small italic text, in a guide for new Niva owners, saved us from the ignominy of the slow trundle to Nevesinje, and sent us back homewards to Sarajevo. A New Zealand Niva enthusiast, Mark Baxter has a page for new Niva users. Here, it is noted that the diff-lock lever can get stuck if infrequently used. And here, Lady’s lesson in life is delivered. To paraphrase: When things seem stuck, reverse a little and try again. This may take several goes. Sound advice for a sticky diff-lock and sound advice for life.

By one o’clock this morning, all were home safe and sound in Sarajevo, grateful to the various kind strangers who stopped (variously calling up a friend to get a number of a local mechanic or giving us sympathy), and grateful to Lady for an amazing trip round Herzegovina and back up into Bosnia.

Planned route

Actual route

Bosnia’s Elections 2014 – Cantonal Level

It’s an election year here in Bosnia, with October elections to legislatures in 10 cantons, both entities and the state parliament, and direct presidential elections in Republika Srpska and for the three member state presidency. The elections run on a four year cycle, with elections to the municipal councils running every four years in the interim. Olympic games – municipal elections; Football world cup – state, entities and cantons.
Municipal elections as a mid-term indicator

The municipal elections can serve as a useful guide to directions of change – when I was writing Making the Transition the 2008 vote pointed towards the decline of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) one of the main advocates of centralisation in Bosnia. They had enjoyed major success in 2006, including securing the Bosniak seat on the state Presidency; and many of their 2006 gains were subsequently wiped out in 2010.

2014 seems more difficult to predict, given the unrest and dissatisfaction evident, especially in the Federation. It doesn’t seem that any party has been able to respond to the dissatisfaction in a way that might translate into electoral support.

A tale of two peoples? Stability and change

Maps showing the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with Brčko District, and the 10 Cantons of the federation. Maps taken from Making the Transition, 2011.

At the level of the cantons, pooling the results of Municipal elections suggested a fair degree of stability in the three cantons more heavily populated by Croats (Posavina [2 in the map above] in the north and Western Herzegovina [8] and Canton 10*). Here, politics is dominated by the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ BiH) and their splinter party, HDZ 1990.

There are five Cantons which have larger concentrations of Bosniaks (1 Una Sana, 3 Tuzla, 4 Zenica-Doboj, 5 Bosnian Podrinja, 9 Sarajevo). Throughout these, the main picture seems to be that the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the party formerly led by Alija Izetbegović, is gaining in strength, mainly at the expense of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). This fits with a degree of disillusionment over the SDP record in government; the SDP member of the state Presidency resigned from the party in the middle of his term, serving the remaining time as an independent. 

Tuzla Canton: Projections for 2014 elections based on 2012 municipal results, showing stability for most parties but a loss of 3 seats for SDP and an equivalent gain for SDA. 

Two further cantons, Central Bosnia [6], and Herzegovina-Neretva [7], based around Mostar, have a more even split between the Bosniak and Croat population. Mostar failed to hold municipal elections in 2012, and as it has the largest electorate in the H-N canton, the absence this means there is less of a solid indicator of changes or stability in political direction

In Central Bosnia, the patterns of the Bosniak and Croat-dominated cantons are repeated: stability in HDZ BiH and other Croat-oriented parties (who make up around 1/3 of assembly members). There are drops in support for the SDP as well as for Bosniak-oriented and Multi-ethnic parties (SBB, SBiH, NSRB, the latter possibly winning no seats). The SDA looks to gain from these losses to make up roughly 1/3 of the assembly. 

‘All else being equal’ these educated guesses might suggest a shift back to the domination of the SDA and HDZ in the Federation, but in light of the protests and the Plenums in this part of the country, ‘all things being equal’ does not seem like a safe assumption. New parties can emerge and make an impact relatively swiftly here, as was seen when media-boss Fahrudin Radončić launched his Union for a Better Future (SBB) party in 2009, gaining enough support to secure ministerial representation in the state government after the 2010 elections. Not everyone has a media empire to back them up (Alfa TV, daily paper Dnevni Avaz), but to a lesser extent, other new parties (NSRB, founded 2001) and splinter parties (HDZ 1990, Party of Democratic Activity ASDA) have been able to form a presence, especially at the local level. 

The parties

Following is a list of the main parties covered here

• ASDA, Party of Democratic Activity, splinter party of SDA, Bosniak-oriented, strongest in Una Sana and Zenica cantons. 
• HDZ BiH, Croatian Democratic Union, largest Croat-oriented party, strongest in Croat-dominated cantons and mixed cantons, but present in Assemblies in Zenica-Doboj and Tuzla too. One of the main pre-war parties of government. 
• HDZ 1990, Croatian Democratic Union 1990, splinter party of HDZ BiH, present in Croat and mixed cantons. 
• NSRB, People’s Party for Improvement through Work, multi-ethnic, liberal party founded in 2001, presence has been building in most cantons, but mid-term results suggest a fall-off in support. 
• SBB, multi-ethnic party founded by media-boss and construction entrepreneur Fahrudin Radončić, recently removed from office as minister of security following violent anti-government protests in February. Represented in all cantons except Western Herzegovina and Canton 10. 
• SBiH, Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, pro-centralisation Bosniak party, enjoyed success in 2006 elections, but saw a major turnaround in 2010. Represented in all cantons except Western Herzegovina and Canton 10.
• SDA, Party of Democratic Action, the largest Bosniak-oriented party and another of the main pre-war parties, represented in all Cantons except Western Herzegovina. After losses in 2010, bounced back in municipal elections. 
• SDP, Social Democratic Party, multi-ethnic party, has been in office at various levels and stages in post-war Bosnia. Largest party in a number of Cantons in 2010 elections (Una Sana, Tuzla, Bosnian Podrinja, Sarajevo). 

*The naming of Canton 10 is a matter of dispute, and it is known variously as Kanton 10, Livanjski kanton, and Hercegbosanska županija. 

Sarajevo Plenum – Deliberation and Demands

Last week, I had my first opportunity to attend one of the Plenums, citizen forums that have been set up in many towns and cities in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the protests in February. In Sarajevo, these meet at Dom Mladih, the Youth House.

It was an important meeting as those present voted on the proposed demands to be sent to the Cantonal Assembly here in Sarajevo, and to the Federal Parliament.

The meeting starts with a reminder of house rules, emphasising the fact that while the plenum has moderators, it does not have leaders. The plenums give attendees the space to speak for up to two minutes, and with the support of the room, this can be extended. From these talks, and from working groups, proposals are formulated which go to a vote.

The Plenum heard from representatives visiting from the other Plenums. Of these, the Tuzla representative raised the loudest cheers. In Tuzla they have enjoyed a number of successes, including limiting a range of financial benefits for cantonal assembly members, and the appointment of a new premier, Bahrija Umihanić, a professor of economics. Although the process of appointment was not in line with the Plenum’s hopes, Umihanić attended the meeting of the Plenum in Tuzla on Saturday, suggesting a willingness for dialogue.

In Sarajevo, the demands that had been formulated over preceding weeks were put to a vote, and each received broad support. The Sarajevo Plenum demands to the Cantonal Assembly include a range of social measures, including unemployment benefits, a call for new employment programmes, and space on broadcast media to widen the dialogue represented by the plenum. Demands to the Federal government have been sent to other Plenums, so that a united position can be presented. Already these have the support of Mostar, Tuzla and Bugojno Plenums.

Last Thursday, the local, cantonal demands were to be presented to the Cantonal Assembly, but a scout through the web-based media for that day suggested that it had made little in the way of ripples. Likewise the agenda for today's meeting of the assembly made no mention of it. This reflects something of a loss of the force behind public messages about the level of disappointment with government. The street protests in Sarajevo, while enduring, are much reduced in numbers, and the regular coverage has faded.

There will be elections later this year, but the Plenums are avowedly not endorsing any political party, so for now the issue seems to be one of translating the deliberative work of the Plenums into policy that is considered, adjusted and possibly delivered by representatives chosen in general elections. 

Meeting of the Sarajevo Plenum - 12 March 2014

Football – only a game?

This is a big year for Bosnia – elections, thirty years since Sarajevo and Yugoslavia hosted the winter Olympics, and a century since the assassination of Arch-duke Franz Ferdinand. But it also marks the first time that Bosnia and Herzegovina has qualified for the football world cup. The national team, the dragons (zmajevi), will be heading to Brazil. In the meantime, the trophy paid a visit to Sarajevo, and the team played a friendly game against Egypt last week.

Football, and to be fair, sport of any kind, is not my strong suite, but sporting events are frequently invested with a significance that goes far beyond the athleticism, skills and tactics of the players. The match between the US and Iran at the ’98 world cup is often highlighted as easing tensions between the countries, the captains’ gestures in exchanging gifts at the outset praised as diplomacy on the pitch, but this makes something of a contrast to the words of Ayatollah Khameni’s post-match analysis:

Tonight, again, the strong and arrogant opponent felt the bitter taste of defeat at your hands

In Belgium, football is seen variously as a potential unifying force and an arena in which the country’s divisions are reflected. In Scotland, local rivalries are mixed in with sectarian division. Kosovo fans burned the Serbian flag ahead of their first international football game against Haiti in Mitrovica.

A friend who knows much more about these things than me tells me that it has been associated with hopes of minority integration in France, and with overcoming post-war division in Rwanda. So, what of Bosnia?

Football – mirror to the state

Creating state-level institutions and symbols is not easy here – whether it is a currency, a flag, a state-level judiciary, or a single state-level policing structure. These invariably face political challenges from those who see, and who wish to retain, power at the more local level of government. Until 2005, the country had two armies. Even then, Paddy Ashdown outlines how it took a couple of major scandals in Republika Srpska to give him the leverage to push the changes through (those would be giving refuge to war time General and indicted suspect for war crimes and genocide, Ratko Mladić, and providing military equipment to Iraq in contravention of UN sanctions).

But, in 2002, only two years after Bosnia and Herzegovina formed its first unified border police service, the Bosnian Football Association was formed, bringing together teams from the Federation and Republika Srpska together into one league. The name ‘Nogometni/Fudbalski Savez Bosne I Hercegovine’ reflects the fact that there are variations in the language spoken here.

Before the war, there had been a Bosnian League, and the current association notes that clubs like the local team in Grbavica, Željezničar, Borac of Banja Luka, and Velež of Mostar all went on to win the Yugoslavia wide championship. After the war, the system of football, like most other systems, divided along ethnic and entity lines.

How was unification achieved? In a way, it followed the pattern of the general peace settlement – first Bosniak and Croat teams formed a joint league, followed by agreement on the inclusion of teams from Republika Srpska some time later (in women’s football, this happened last year). Power sharing and the division of appointments followed ethnic lines, with a three member presidency just like the state level government.

When this resulted in Bosnia’s suspension from FIFA for contravening their statute and principles, a dose of international intervention was applied with a FIFA-appointed ‘normalisation committee’, but one made up of domestic football personalities. Maybe this kind of intervention is easier when it is only a game, and when the real centres of state power are not at stake.

Euphoria and common feeling

Football being an internationalised game, only a couple of players in the squad of 29 currently play club-level football in Bosnia. The Bosnian diaspora being what it is, about half have not played at club level in Bosnia. Nonetheless, those with domestic experience have represented clubs across the country. So is this a national institution that can help develop some degree of unity and common feeling in Bosnia?

An article published in the Banja Luka daily, Nezavisne Novine, a paper established after the war with support from US AID to promote non-nationalist media, paints a picture of active, if quieter support for the national squad in Banja Luka, capital of the Republika Srpska.

Further success may support this – euphoria can be infectious. And as a game, football is something that people can project hopes and aspirations onto – the process of articulating hopes for a national team may well translate into a greater identification with the national space. Bosnia have a good chance of getting through the group stages, sustaining the excitement about the dragons a little longer.

A stronger identification with the national level is not inconsistent with other levels or forms of identity and may change how people see the state. Nonetheless, the problems in Bosnia are systematic and need resolution at the political level, and no amount of football will fix that.

And the atmosphere here in Sarajevo when the dragons played Egypt? I’d love to say, but football really is not my strong suite and the screen I was glued to was at Meeting Point cinema, where they were showing the Dallas Buyers Club. I’ll try harder for the first world cup game against Argentina.

Love football, love coffee? Come to Bosnia!

Cups €12.50 at the BH Fan Shop

Mass policing and micro protests

A couple of weeks back the director of the police in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dragan Lukač, predicted mass protests for 7 March. His predictions came with warnings about the need for new laws on dealing with disorder, suggesting that he anticipated mass protests and disorder would go hand in hand.

The protests continue in Sarajevo and elsewhere, but a visit to the city centre yesterday painted a different picture, one of mass policing and micro protest. Yesterday, with a heavy police presence (including special public order units with full protective gear, helmets etc.), a small group of protesters was restricted to the pavement and an area in Mali Park (see pictures). Again today, traffic was running normally as the protesters were limited to the park area, albeit behind a far lighter cordon of police in their normal, civilian uniforms.

Throughout the protests, which have lasted for more than a month, demonstrators have been blocking one of the city centre's main cross roads. A few days back, after police decided to let traffic through before the end of the protest, a car injured two protesters. In the following days, taxi drivers joined the protests, using their vehicles to block traffic and thus making an important contribution to the safety of the demonstrators. Meanwhile, in Mostar, the last couple of days have seen new police restrictions on protesters.

All in all, it points towards a more 'robust' response from police to what have been, since Saturday 8 February, peaceful, if disruptive protests. Another Sarajevo Plenum will be held on Wednesday. The Plenum has already voiced its objection to the policing of the protests, including the arrest of three protesters (in German here). We can expect to hear more on this.

In the meantime, regarding the violence of 8 February, police are dealing with this using legislation on terrorism and attacks on the constitutional order. On Friday, two were detained under the relevant provisions of state criminal law.

Police and protesters, Sarajevo, 7 March

Reading the (Bosnian) Riots

Last summer, William Hunt, Ferida Duraković and Zvonimir Radeljković wrote in Dissent about the possibility that a younger generation of Bosnians might turn to protest. Less than a year on, this has come to pass, but it is not just the younger generation, rather people of all ages. 

My first few days in the country have given me a chance to talk to people about the protests in a number of cities here, and about the violence that took place in early February in Tuzla, Bihać, Mostar, Sarajevo and Zenica, the five largest cities in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

The move from relatively peaceful protests to a swift escalation and spread brought to mind the UK’s own riots in 2011, when what started as a peaceful protest outside a police station in Tottenham became violent, and then spread first to other areas of London and then to other major urban centres in England. 

The most obvious difference between those riots, and the riots here in Bosnia, is the targeted nature of violence. Here, the targets were overwhelmingly government buildings, including cantonal government offices, state institutions, and in Mostar, political party offices. This is in stark contrast to the UK, where a joint Guardian/LSE report, Reading the Riots, paints a picture of a combination of battles with police and the widespread targeting of commercial premises. 

The sources of dissatisfaction bear some similarity, albeit defined by different contexts. The Guardian/LSE study sample of rioters most commonly cited poverty, policing, government policy, unemployment and the shooting of Mark Duggan as important causes of the riots. 

Before the widespread riots of 7 February, protests in Tuzla had centred on the collapse of the canton’s industries, particularly after a series of privatisations. Workers who saw their industries, their jobs and their livelihoods disappear, sought some form of compensation. Alongside this is a strong sense that the politicians here are doing very well in a country suffering widespread poverty and mass unemployment. A common chant heard during protests is lopovi (thieves). Again and again, injustice comes up. But the background of dissatisfaction with the police and policing has not been a factor I have seen here yet. 

In another way, policing may be important. When I was last in Sarajevo in 2005 various international agencies, including the EU and the Office of the High Representative, were focusing on the problem of police coordination in a country with 10 cantonal forces, two entity forces, a special district force, a state force, and a border force. A television campaign featured a police officer pursuing gangsters, only to be stopped by an invisible barrier. While maintaining day to day order is a responsibility of Cantonal police, the security of Federal and State buildings is down to those particular levels of government. So in Sarajevo, when there is a mass protest, which involves attacks on Federal and State buildings, three forces are involved, and it has been suggested that failures in coordination limited the police ability to contain the violence. 

A number of stories are doing the rounds regarding the violence, the extent to which it was orchestrated and if police ineffectiveness might have been part of a political strategy. It’s interesting that these stories have currency, but on the question of the police response, it is also worth remembering how many days passed in the UK before the riots of 2011 were contained. 

As it happened, the violence was more or less limited to two days in Tuzla and one in other cities. Like in London and other UK cities, it was followed by citizen-led clean-up actions. It has also been followed by a more peaceful form of direct democracy, as plenums meet in various locations and pass requests to governments. Already, the Tuzla plenum has claimed a victory in the scrapping of the bijeli hljeb (white bread) payments that representatives receive at the end of their mandate. 

Independence day – a contested holiday

Today I moved in and out of independence day (Dan nezavisnosti). A walk up through Grbavica, my new home in Sarajevo, to the Vraca Park memorial to those who died in the Second World War took me out of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and briefly into Bosnia’s other entity, Republika Srpska. In the absence of a state-level law on the ‘independence day’ holiday, this meant moving from one part of the country where the holiday is recognised, to another where it is not.

1 March 1992 was the second day of the referendum in which a majority of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s voters opted for separation from a Yugoslav federation that had already seen three of six republics opt for independence. The referendum was not supported in municipalities under the control of Serb political parties such as Radovan Karadžić’s Serbian Democratic Party. Recognition of the new state came the following month, but was swiftly followed by the escalation of hostilities in a war lasted until late 1995.

It is no surprise that the state contested at its birth (some may say rebirth pointing to the medieval Bosnian kingdom, or the republic’s place in Yugoslavia), and in many ways continuously contested since, should struggle to find consensus on a meaningful national day. The same problem occurs in November, with Statehood Day (Dan državnosti, 25 November) and Day of the Republic (Dan Republike, 29 November), which respectively mark the ZAVNOBiH and AVNOJ* meetings of 1943. These can be taken as formal beginnings for post-war socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia.

Željko Komsić, the current head of the three member state Presidency who stands as the Croat member of the ethnically-defined troika, marked the occasion with a formal reception for local dignitaries and international representatives. His colleague Bakir Izetbegović, the Bosniak representative, unable to attend on health grounds, marked the occasion with a positive message to the country’s citizens.

The Serb member of the rotating presidency, Nebojša Radmanović, stated that the day is not, and will not be, a state-recognised holiday. The day is one which is cited as featuring the first victim of the Bosnian war, a wedding guest shot while carrying a Serbian flag in the old town of Sarajevo, Baščaršija.

Likewise, while Nermin Nikšić, prime minister of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina wished all citizens of Bosnia a happy independence day, Milorad Dodik, president of the Republika Srpska is quoted in the Serbian daily, Blic, characterising the day as one of trauma, not only for Bosnia’s Serbs who were separated from Serbs in other states, but also for Croats and Bosniaks, because of the violence of the ensuing secession. Such a position depends on an assumption that in the absence of a referendum, Bosnia would have avoided war. Given the existing tensions and violence in the country and elsewhere in Yugoslavia before the referendum, this is not a given.  

So for now, the day of independence is one endorsed by authorities on one side of an internal border, and two-thirds of a three member presidency. 

*ZAVNOBiH – State Anti-Fascist Council for the People’s Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; AVNOJ – Anti-Fascist Council for the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia

Getting back to Bosnia

It’s nearly 10 years since I left Sarajevo, and I think I’ve got a lot of catching up to do. 

Last month, I spent an evening with a group of UK Army officers discussing my research on international intervention and assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Much of this focused on the respective roles of international police missions (my area) and military missions (theirs) in stabilisation and democratisation. 

Beyond that, and with an eye to possible future deployments, the company were interested in possible sources of unrest and disorder in the future. I didn’t see any trouble on the near horizon. 

Less than a month later, there was barely a window left on the front of the Tuzla Canton Government building, and the BHRT Dnevnik, the national broadcaster’s news programme, was showing images of similar destruction in other cities including Mostar, Sarajevo and Zenica. Like I say, I’ve got a lot of catching up to do. 

My catching up starts properly in a few days, when I begin a six month stay in Sarajevo, working on research, and supported through an association with the Faculty of Criminology, Criminalistics and Security Studies at the University of Sarajevo. 

So, when asked about sources of disorder, why didn’t I see what was just round the corner? 

Perhaps because it was something absolutely new. Watching the news the day after, and talking to a colleague in Sarajevo, there seemed to be a genuine sense of shock at the violence of the protests on Friday 7 February. 

Moreover, while the dissatisfaction underlying the protests may be enduring, the violence itself was fleeting. And watching developments subsequently, there has been a fairly swift move to establish Plenums, forums of citizens gathering, formulating and peacefully articulating their requests to the governing bodies that they feel let down by. 

So maybe I can be forgiven for not seeing what was about to happen. Either way, it’s an exciting and interesting time to be getting back to Bosnia. 

Sarajevo in 2005, the view from Vraca Memorial Park